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In this paper, we investigate the nature of asymmetry in the influence of oil price changes on 
output in five MENA countries. These are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab 
Emirates, Tunisia, and Qatar. To get more observation for our analysis, we proxy GDP with 
industrial output and hence our inference is based on a relatively larger sample compared to 
previous studies. The results that we obtain are interesting and intuitive. First, we find that 
growth in MENA countries is linked to oil in the sense that it benefits from higher oil prices 
and it gets hurt by a fall in the oil market. Moreover, there are pronounced short- and long-term 
asymmetries in the influence of oil on output. In particular, the output is faster to respond to 
increases in the oil price than it responds to decreases. The long-term influence to a rise in oil 
is also higher, though it is realized over a longer period. These results are important and can be 
used to guide policies that are concerned with stabilizing the economies of the MENA region 
against oil price fluctuations.1     
 
 
      
________________________ 




1 The authors would like to thank the seminar participants of the Economic Research Forum annual conference 
held in Kuwait from 10-12 March 2019. In particular authors thank Professor Samir Ghazouani from the Business 




In the literature, there is extensive evidence that in oil importer countries, rises in the price 
of oil trigger economic recessions, while its fall is unlikely to start a comparable economic 
expansion.2 These asymmetries in the response of output to the change in the price of oil are 
surprising as the purchasing power of oil importers rises and falls by the same amount after 
similar positive and negative changes in the price of oil.3 Therefore, one would expect an 
asymmetric response of output to the same exogenous negative and positive oil shocks in the 
oil importing as well as the oil exporting countries.4 
Many explanations have been provided in the literature.5 For instance, Hamilton (1988) 
attributed asymmetry to the reallocation effects that accompany the changes in the relative 
prices with respect to oil. A shock to oil disturbs the relative values and it leads to reallocation 
of resources which is costly for the economy. In an oil importer economy, this exacerbates the 
bad influence of an increase in the oil price and it reduces the positive impact following its 
decline. Another explanation of asymmetry is provided by Bernanke (1983) who has explained 
it by the increase in uncertainty following oil price changes. Uncertainty reduces investment 
spending particularly in those sectors where cash flows depend on oil.6 Edelstein and Kilian 
(2009) explained the asymmetry in the context of the employment uncertainty and the increases 
in the precautionary savings after an unexpected change in the price of oil. In both Bernanke 
 
2 See for instance, Bernanke et al. (1997); Hamilton (1988), Balke, Brown and Yucel (2002), Edlestein and Kilian 
(2009), Kilian and Vigfusson (2009), Elder and Serletis (2010), Kilian & Vigfusson (2011a,b, 2013), Herrera, et 
al. (2011, 2015), Baumeister and Kilian (2016), Baumeister et al. (2018), Baumeister and Hamilton (2019), and 
among many others.   
3 Note that with the increase in the oil price, resources are transferred from oil importing countries to oil exporting 
countries. Hence, the purchasing power decreases and increases for oil importers and exporters respectively.  
4 Using an asymmetric version of the MIDAS model (AMIDAS), Maghyereh et al. (2018) investigated the 
asymmetric impact of daily oil price shocks on the quarterly real domestic product of eight developed countries 
during the period (1983-2016). They significant asymmetric relationship between oil price shocks and output.  
5 Herrera et al. (2019) provide a comprehensive survey of the literature.  
6 This is obvious in energy sectors but less clear in other sectors. 
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(1983) and Edelstein and Kilian (2009) uncertainty tends to lessen expansions after oil declines 
and to worsen recessions after oil market rallies.  
A third explanation of asymmetry that is provided in the literature lies in how monetary 
policy reacts to increases in the oil price. Bernanke et al. (1997) indicate that while the Fed 
may increase rates following a hike in energy prices in order to block inflation, it does nothing 
when oil prices decrease. These asymmetries in the monetary policy response introduce 
corresponding asymmetries in output response to the same changes of oil prices. 
In the literature, the analysis of asymmetry focuses on net oil importing countries and there 
is little evidence on whether the response of output to oil shocks is asymmetric in oil exporting 
regions. Hence, it is interesting to investigate asymmetries in oil exporters and whether it can 
be explained by reallocation effects, uncertainty effects and monetary policy effects. The only 
difference is that in oil abundant regions, oil is expected to be positively related to output and 
hence, oil price declines are likely to trigger recessions whereas its increases are expected to 
be expansionary.  
The literature on how oil price changes influence GDP in the context of MENA countries is 
still underdeveloped.7 However, there is a group of studies which found that the negative 
influence of oil price falls is more pronounced than the positive influence of its rises. This 
surprising result is explained by the increase in the rent-seeking behavior, poor policies and 
reallocation effects that accompany the rise in oil. Moreover, the rise in the oil price increases 
government investment spending and this crowds out private capital and investments with 
negative repercussions on economic growth.  
 
7 Most studies on oil in the MENA region focus on the relationship between oil and equities. See for instance, 
Maghyereh, and Al‐Kandari (2007); Arouri and Rault (2010); Akoum et al. (2012); Awartani and Maghyereh 
(2013); Jouini and Harrathi (2014); Maghyereh and Awartani (2016); Awartani et al. (2018); Maghyereh et al. 




Therefore, in this paper, we aim to contribute to the current literature by investigating 
asymmetry in the response of real industrial production to oil price changes using a sample of 
five MENA countries. It is widely believed that the MENA region is an oil region and that 
higher oil prices are good for its trade, investment, and economic growth. Hence, studying 
asymmetry to oil price changes in this region is indicative of the extent the reallocation, 
uncertainty and monetary policy effects that accompany the changes in the oil price. Three of 
the countries in our sample are big exporters of oil. These are Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, and 
Qatar. The remaining two countries produce oil, but at quantities that fall short of their domestic 
consumption.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 a brief literature review is 
provided. In section 3, we outline the methodology that we use to measure the relationship 
and to test for asymmetry. In particular, we present the specification that will be estimated 
and the tests for short-term influence, long-term cointegration, and asymmetry. The data set 
and its characteristics will be provided in section 4. In Section 5, we present the empirical 
findings.  Section 6 checks the robustness of results under a different data generating process. 
Finally, in section 7 we provide some policy recommendations.  
2. Literature Review 
The influence of oil prices on the output of oil exporting countries has been investigated by 
many researchers. The evidence is that the oil market performance is a decisive factor that 
explains the economic performance of oil-producing countries. For instance, Allegret et al. 
(2014) show an improved current account balance of 27 oil exporting countries when oil prices 
increase.12 Similarly, Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009) record appreciations in the real 
 
12 From MENA countries his sample includes, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait among others. 
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exchange rate following a rise in the oil price. The study by Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009) 
finds that Iranian output growth can be explained by the growth in the oil price. The group of 
oil exporting countries that are studied by El Anshasy and Bradley (2012) is found to grow 
during periods of high growth in the oil price. They attributed the high growth in output to 
higher government oil revenues and spending.           
Some studies have investigated the influence of oil prices on the output of MENA countries. 
Mehrara (2008) finds that while output growth is negatively affected by a fall in the oil market, 
its response to rise is weak and negligible. His sample extends over the 1965-2004 period and 
it contains thirteen oil exporting countries that include Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE. The same results for the period 1979-2009 are arrived at by the VAR model of Moshiri 
and Banijashem (2012) who find that spending drops after oil price falls and that this negatively 
influences economic growth. In their study, they also find that rises in oil prices are unlikely to 
be translated into sustained growth. Other similar results have been provided by Cologni and 
Manera (2013) who used cointegration and error correction model analysis over the period that 
extends from 1960 to 2010.13 
The recent study of Nusair (2016) stands at a stark opposite of these findings. In his study 
of the GCC countries, he finds that oil price increases lead to an increase in the real GDP, while 
oil price decreases are found to have only a limited effect on output.14 His sample extends from 
1975 to 2014 and he accounts for non-linearity and asymmetry in the oil price influence by 
using a non-linear ARDL model.  
 
13 In a recent study, Maghyereh et al. (2019) investigated the influence of oil price uncertainty on the real economic 
activity in Jordan and Turkey during the period 1986 –2014. Their results indicate that oil market uncertainty has 
a negative influence on the industrial output of Jordan and Turkey. 
14 The GCC is an economic block of oil producing countries that include: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab 
Emirates, Oman and Bahrain. All these are countries that belong to the MENA region. The only countries that are 
found to be affected by a drop in the oil price are Kuwait and Qatar.   
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As can be seen, in all of these studies annual data is used to arrive at a conclusion on the 
relationship between oil and output. The main reason for that is the lack of GDP data at higher 
than the annual frequency in all of the MENA countries. The history of these countries has not 
started until the 1960s, and the biggest sample size on GDP data that is obtainable does not go 
beyond 50 observations. In a sequence, Mehrara’s (2008) sample is 40 observations, Moshiri 
and Banijashem’s (2012) sample is 31 observations, Cologni and Manera’s (2013) sample is 
51 observations and Nusair’s (2016) sample is 30 observations. Therefore, the results obtained 
in these studies are prone to suffer from biases that are due to the small sample size. The 
parameter estimates of the impact and their standard errors may be inaccurate and it suffers 
from parameter estimation errors despite their consistency.  
Moreover, with the exception of Nusair (2016), these studies have inferred from a linear 
relationship. However, as we mentioned previously, the relationship between oil shocks and 
output is likely to be asymmetric due to reallocation, uncertainty and monetary policy effects. 
Therefore, measuring a non-linear relationship with a linear model will definitely lead to a 
biased inference on the extent of response of output to oil shocks.     
In this paper, we overcome these problems of data limitations in the MENA region by using 
the industrial output as a proxy for real GDP. The industrial output is available at the monthly 
frequency and it may not deviate from the state of the economy for a long time period and 
hence, it is closely related to real output particularly in the long term.15 In our analysis, we 
focus on the period that followed the global financial crisis and our samples extend from 2006 
to 2018 depending on the country. The number of data points ranges from 89 for Egypt to 125 
for Tunisia and hence, our sample is relatively large compared to previously investigated 
samples.  
 
15 The electricity consumption may be also used to proxy GDP. However, it is less correlated than industrial output 
with economic cycles and its data is only available at the annual frequency.  
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To account for any potential non-linearity between output and oil, we use as Nusair (2016), 
the non-linear ARDL model of Shin et al. (2014). But unlike Nusair, our sample does not suffer 
from the small sample bias as it contains more observations. In addition, for the purpose of 
comparison, we include Egypt and Tunis and we have provided a full account and explanation 
of our findings.  
The results that we obtain are different but they are intuitive: we find that a rise in the oil 
price triggers an expansion and a fall triggers a recession. The exception is Tunis in which the 
relation is the other way around as it is a net oil importer country. These results contrast the 
bulk of the literature on the limited influence of oil price increases (Mehrara, 2008; Moshiri 
and Banijashem, 2012; Cologni and Manera, 2013) on the economies of the MENA countries. 
However, our findings agree partially with Nusair’s (2016) results with the exception that the 
negative influence of oil falls is found to be unanimous across all oil net exporters in our 
sample, a result which is not substantiated by Nusair (2016).  
There is significant asymmetry in the response of output to oil price changes in both the 
long as well as in the short term. The industrial output is found to respond quicker and by more 
to increases in the oil price than to decreases. The positive long- term impact of an increase in 
the price of oil is found to be larger than the negative impact of a fall in the oil price. This is 
found despite the slower adjustment of output in the rise than in the fall of energy prices.       
3. Methodology 
The asymmetric bound-testing approach (NARDL) developed by Shin et al. (2014) is used 
in the current study to examine the asymmetric effects of oil price changes on industrial output 
in the MENA region. The NARDL framework utilizes negative and positive partial sum 
decompositions of the independent variables which enables us to easily detect asymmetric 
interactions between variables in the short- and long-run.  
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Suppose that 𝐼𝑃  and 𝑂𝑃  are the real industrial production and the real oil prices in a 
particular MENA country.16 Following Shin et al. (2014), a simple asymmetric long run 
relationship between oil and output after control for two key macroeconomic variables can be 
written as  
𝐼𝑃 = 𝛽 𝑂𝑃 + 𝛽 𝑂𝑃 + 𝛾 𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 𝛾 𝑅 + 𝑢                                  (1) 
                    ∆𝑂𝑃 = 𝜗                                                                                                          (2) 
where 𝐼𝑁𝐹   is the inflation and 𝑅  is the real interest rate (lending rate). In this specification  
𝐼𝑃  and 𝑂𝑃  are assumed to have one cointegrating relationship. Instead of having the long run 
relationship with the oil price 𝑂𝑃 , it is modelled with the partial sums of the negative 𝑂𝑃  and 
the positive 𝑂𝑃  oil price processes, 𝑂𝑃 = 𝑂𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃 . These partial sums are 
computed as 
𝑂𝑃 = ∆𝑂𝑃 = max ∆𝑂𝑃 , 0 ; 𝑂𝑃 = ∆𝑂𝑃 = min ∆𝑂𝑃 , 0  
 The formulation in Eq.1 demonstrates a cointegrating relationship between the oil price and 
the output that could be asymmetric with respect to long-term partial sums of the oil price. If 
the |𝛽 | ≠ |𝛽 |, then similar increases and decreases in the oil price will not have the same 
impact on output. In that sense, the model contains a regime switching cointegrating 
relationship which is governed by the sign of changes in the oil price.17 
The expansion of output in MENA countries is not expected to drive the oil price and hence, 
we do not expect endogeneity problems in the context of this model. However, the model as it 
stands does not account for the short-term dynamics of the influence of the oil price on 
 
16 All quantities are denominated in the domestic currency of the relevant country.  
17 Note that this relationship is not unique as for every trajectory of partial sums in the oil price there is different 
long-term relationship. The simple model in Eq. 1 has been first applied by Schorderet (2001) to capture the non-
linear relationship between output and unemployment.  
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economic growth and hence, it is not appropriate for us.18 A good representation that satisfies 
our needs is the nonlinear dynamic autoregressive distributed lag model (ARDL) of Shin et al. 
(2014) as it captures not only asymmetry but also the long and the short-term dynamics.19  
The non-linear 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(𝑝, 𝑞) can be written as 
𝐼𝑃 = ∅ 𝐼𝑃 + 𝜃 𝑂𝑃 + 𝜃 𝑂𝑃 + 𝛿 𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 𝜔 𝑅 +  𝜀     (3)  
where  𝑂𝑃  is defined as 𝑂𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃 + 𝑂𝑃 , and ∅ ’s are the autoregressive parameters that 
capture the own dynamics of the growth process. The 𝜃 and 𝜃  are the asymmetric distributed 
lag parameters that measure the influence of positive and negative partial sums of oil prices 
𝑂𝑃 and 𝑂𝑃 on the industrial output. In Eq. 3, 𝜀  is an 𝑖𝑖𝑑 process with zero mean and constant 
volatility, 𝜎 .      
The relationship in 2.3 can be re-written as:20 
∆𝐼𝑃 = 𝜌𝐼𝑃 + 𝛾 𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 𝛾 𝑅 𝜃 𝑂𝑃 + 𝜃 𝑂𝑃 + 𝛾 ∆𝐼𝑃        
+ 𝜑 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝜑 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝛿 ∆𝐼𝑁𝐹 + 𝜔 ∆𝑅 + 𝜖       (4) 
 
where 𝜌 = ∑ ∅ − 1 , 𝛾 = − ∑ ∅  for 𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝑝 − 1, 𝜃 = ∑ 𝜃 , 𝜃 =
∑ 𝜃 , 𝜑 = 𝜃 , 𝜑 = − ∑ 𝜃   for 𝑗 = 1, … . , 𝑞 − 1.  
Note that Eq. 4 is actually an error correction formulation of the relationship between oil 
and industrial production which may be written as 
 
18Furthermore, the serial correlations of the errors may complicate testing as the asymptotic distribution of the 
parameters may not be Gaussian under these conditions. The OLS estimator may remain consistent, but still the 
parameters are poorly determined particularly in small samples.  
19 The model extends the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach of Pesaran and Shin (1998) and Pesaran 
et al. (2001) in order to capture asymmetry and non-linearity in the relationship between the variables.    
20 It is straightforward to get Eq. 4 from Eq. 3 following Pesaran et al. (2001).   
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∆𝐼𝑃 = 𝜌𝐸𝐶𝑇 +  𝛾 ∆𝐼𝑃 + 𝜑 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝜑 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝜖      (5) 
Where 𝐸𝐶𝑇 = 𝐼𝑃 − 𝛽 𝑂𝑃 − 𝛽 𝑂𝑃 , and it represents the cointegrating vector that 
describes the error correction term. The parameters 𝛽 =  and 𝛽 =   are the 
corresponding long-term parameters. Note that unlike the usual cointegrating relationship, this 
vector is non-linear and it captures the long-term asymmetries of the influence of the oil partial 
sums on the industrial production. 
In Eq.5, we do not expect endogeneity as the oil price is driven by global factors and not by 
the growth of MENA economies.21 Also note that by including an appropriate lag structure in 
Eq. 5, we may free the model from potential serial correlations in the residuals. 
However, if the residuals are not independent of the regressors in Eq.5 we may use 
instruments of the actual changes in the oil price instead. The data generating process of oil 
price changes can be written in a reduced form as: 
∆𝑂𝑃 = 𝜓 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝜉  
where 𝜉 ∼ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 0, ∑ , with ∑  is a 𝑘 × 𝑘 positive definite covariance matrix.22 Thus, the 
residuals 𝜖  in Eq.5 may expressed conditionally on oil price changes as:  
𝜖 = ꙍ 𝜉 + 𝑒 = ꙍ ∆𝑂𝑃 − 𝜓 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝑒  
By substituting 𝜖  into Eq.5 and re-arranging we get the following error correction model:  
 
21 This can be easily corrected for by using instrumental variables of the changes in the oil price. For instance, we 
may regress ∆𝑂𝑃 = ∑ 𝜋 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝜗  and use the fitted values in order to get orthogonal partial sums in Eq.5.     
22 𝑘 is the number of regressors entering the long-term equation.  
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     ∆𝐼𝑃 = 𝜌𝐸𝐶𝑇 +  𝛾 ∆𝐼𝑃 + 𝜋 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝜋 ∆𝑂𝑃 + 𝑒           (6) 
where 𝜋 = 𝜑 + ꙍ , 𝜋 = 𝜑 + ꙍ , 𝜋 = 𝜑 + ꙍ 𝜓 , 𝜋 = 𝜑 − ꙍ 𝜓  for 𝑗 =
1, … . 𝑞 − 1.  
Note that when 𝜌 in Eq.6 is zero, there is no cointegration between oil and output and hence, 
all the parameters of the non-linear cointegrating vector are zeros. This implies that the oil price 
changes have no influence on output in the long term. An F test for the null of 𝜌 = 𝜃 = 𝜃 =
0 has been proposed by Pesaran et al. (2001) and we will refer to this test as 𝐹  test. Under 
the null of no long-term influence, the limiting distribution of the 𝐹  statistics is found to be 
non-standard and hence, critical values can be obtained by stochastic simulation or 
bootstrapping. However, Pesaran et al. (2001) have provided critical bounds that may be used 
for testing by researchers. Given these bounds, if the computed value of the 𝐹  test statistics 
exceeds the upper bound critical value, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. 
However, if it falls below the lower bound, then oil and output are not cointegrated. A value of 
the computed test statistics that lies between the provided bounds, indicate inconclusive results.            
Another nonstandard test for the long term cointegration has been also proposed by Banerjee 
et al. (1998) who suggest testing the null of 𝜌 = 0 against 𝜌 < 0 in 2, we denote this test as the 
𝑡  test. Both of these tests will be used to infer cointegration between oil price changes and 
output. Finally, we test for long- and short-term asymmetry using a standard Wald test of the 
relevant parameters.23   
 The specification in Eq. 6 is appropriate for our purpose as it is able to capture, the short-
term and the long-term dynamics and asymmetry in the relationship between the oil price and 
 
23 The null for the long-term asymmetry test is 𝛽 = 𝛽  and for the short-term asymmetry is  ∑ 𝜋 =
∑ 𝜋 . 
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industrial output. As the model is linear in terms of all of its parameters, it can be estimated by 
a standard OLS estimator.  
4. Data Set  
To investigate non -linear cointegration, long and short-term asymmetry of the oil-output 
relationship in the MENA economies, we use monthly data on the WTI crude oil prices as well 
as on the industrial production of six countries. These countries are Egypt, Tunis, the United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar.24 
For each country, the sample covers a different period depending on the availability of the 
data. In particular, we find data for Egypt from November 2010 to June 2018 for a total of 89 
monthly observations. The data for Saudi Arabia starts in December 2006, but it ends in 
October 2018 and hence, we have found 119 monthly observations. The rest of the samples are 
as follows: the UAE data is available from January 2008 to October 2016, for a total of 105 
observations; The Kuwaiti data from July 2009 to October 2016 for a total of 88 observations; 
The Tunisian data from October 2007 to March 2018 for a total of 125 observations; and 
finally, the Qatari data from January 2019 to October 2016 for a total of 96 observations. 
As nominal prices of oil in the domestic currency may be associated with output through 
inflation, we focus our attention on how the real prices of oil are linked to the real industrial 
output. Both domestic output and oil prices increase with inflation and this may create a 
spurious relationship between the two variables. This is not to say, that a hike in the oil price 
can be inflationary in some of the countries and this may discourage investments and 
 
24   Our analysis restricted only to these MENA countries due to data availability. Specifically, data on industrial 
output and other macroeconomic variables for other MENA countries are not available on a monthly basis.   
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macroeconomic growth.25 However, if this is likely, then it will be captured through the 
relationship between the real price of oil and the real industrial production. 
Therefore, the monthly consumer price index and the monthly foreign exchange rate against 
the dollar are used in order to get real output and real oil prices denominated in the domestic 
currency of the relevant country.26 We use inflation and real interest rate to control for 
macroeconomic variables that may influence the industrial production. The rate of inflation is 
measured as the percentage change in Consumer Price Index (CPI). Real interest rate is 
calculated as a nominal lending rate minus the inflation rate. All data are retrieved from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream.   
Figure 1 displays how the real industrial output changes with real oil prices. The stacked 
diagrams show that the industrial output of the MENA economies expands with the increase in 
the price of oil and shrinks with its decrease. This pattern of the relationship is uniform across 
countries and it is more pronounced during large draw ups and large drawdowns in the real 
price of oil. For instance, the big rally in the oil prices prior to the global financial crisis is 
associated with large increases in the industrial production of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the 
United Arab Emirates.28 Similarly, the industrial output of Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and the UAE 
has dropped significantly with the fall of oil prices during the global financial crisis in 2008. 
The recent fall in oil prices between 2014 and 2016 has been associated with corresponding 
falls in the industrial production of MENA countries as can be seen in the figures. This is not 
unexpected for the oil exporter countries of the MENA region, as higher oil prices in these 
countries may increase resources available for spending and thus economic growth.  
 
25 As mentioned previously, oil is a strategic commodity and the rise in its value may influence core inflation, 
monetary policy and subsequently economic growth.  
26 From DataStream we find only monthly oil prices and monthly industrial production denominated in dollars. 
To obtain values in domestic currency we multiplied by the exchange rate. The oil price and the industrial output 
are then obtained at the June, 2018 constant prices.     
28 Right before the global financial meltdown in 2008, the price of crude oil has reached $ 145 per barrel. 
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[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
It is worth here to mention that the transmission from oil to output may cross through various 
channels. For instance, the increase in the oil price will increase the export revenues and 
consequently government spending and the growth of the oil exporter countries of the MENA 
region such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. However, for the oil importer countries, the hike in 
energy cost will burden the government budget as energy prices are subsidized in most of these 
economies.29 Therefore, the short-term effect on domestic output might not be as strong, but 
the longer-term implications are more taxes, less government spending and lower growth of 
industrial production.  
But the graphs in Figure 1 are not supportive of these ideas. In fact, the influence of oil is 
uniformly positive across oil importers and exporters of the region. It is well known that the 
economies of the MENA region are dependent on oil and that the rise in oil benefits the 
economic development of the whole region through cross country foreign direct investment, 
trade and employment. The capital inflows into the petrodollar economies find its way as 
investments in other neighboring Middle Eastern economies. Moreover, with the expansion of 
oil exporter economies, labor migrate from oil importer Middle Eastern economies into these 
economies. Part of the income generated by the labor movement is transferred to home 
countries, and these transfers tend to support domestic spending, development and economic 
growth. XXXX Explanation of Figure 2.  Figure 2: Partial sum processes of negative and 
positive changes in oil prices and industrial production. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the log real oil price and industrial production of the 
countries in the sample. The table shows that the real oil price is negatively skewed and its 
 
29 In Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, energy is sold below its international market value. In Egypt, the country 
went under a structural adjustment program and energy subsidies are subsequently removed.    
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kurtosis is slightly above the kurtosis of a normal. The Jarque-Bera statistics reject the 
normality of the oil price at conventional levels. This negative skewness is unexpected as most 
commodities including oil are exposed to supply shocks and thus, they are more prone to be 
positively skewed. However, during the period of our sample, oil suffers sharp declines during 
three times: in 2008, in 2014 and in 2016.30 It is possible that these sharp declines in the oil 
price have caused the time series of oil to be negatively skewed.  
Industrial production does not have a consistent pattern across countries. It is positively 
skewed in Egypt, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, but negatively skewed in the UAE and Kuwait. 
There is some excess kurtosis in the industrial production time series, but the null of normally 
distributed industrial output is not rejected in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Note also that 
the volatility of oil is almost three folds the volatility of industrial output. The lower volatility 
and the normality of the industrial output indicate that its time series is more well behaved 
and that it is easier to model and analyze than the price of oil.  
As for the real inflation rate, the Jarque-Bera statistics are significant in most countries 
(except for Tunisia) gold returns in Japan and inflation in the USA). This means that the 
distributions of the real inflation rate are non-normal in most cases. Moreover, the Jarque-Bera 
statistics of the inflation three countries (Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) are not 
insignificant, indicating that the inflation series in these countries follows a non-normal 
distribution with fat tails and a high peak. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Before making any inference using regressions, we first check the stationarity of our 
variables. Table 2 displays the Augmented Dicky Fuller Test of unit roots in the levels, the first 
 
30 The nominal price of oil has dropped from around $133 per barrel in July 2008 to $39 in February 2009. It has 
also dropped from $103 in July 2014 to $59 in December 2014 and subsequently to $30 by the end of February 
2016. The first drop is caused by the uncertainty created by the global financial meltdown in 2008. The drop in 
2014 is caused by the refusal of Saudi Arabia to reduce output in order to support the oil price during the OPEC 
conference meetings. The cooperation in the OPEC has started to collapse.      
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differences and the second differences of the real oil price and the real industrial output time 
series. In the specification used to infer stationarity, we include a constant, a time trend and we 
account for potential dynamics and autocorrelation in the real oil and output for up to 12 lag 
months. As can be seen in the table, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the level of the real oil 
price is not rejected for all countries. However, the first differences of the oil price seem to be 
covariance stationery as the null of a unit root is strongly rejected at the 1% level. The table 
also shows that the industrial output levels contain unit roots with the exception of the Tunisian 
industrial output. Surprisingly, the first differences of the Kuwaiti and Saudi industrial output 
are covariance non-stationary, but the second differences are found to be stationary.   
 [INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
It is well known that the standard ADF unit root test does not take into account any structural 
breaks or nonlinearities in the investigated time series (See, Perron, 1989; Nazlioglu, 2011). As 
pointed out by Perron (1989), ignoring structural breaks can lead to bias that reduces the ability 
to reject a false unit root null hypothesis. In order to account for this possibility and to ensure 
the unit root properties of the data, the Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2004) and Lee et al. (2012) 
unit root test is conducted in this study. It is an LM Lagrange Multiplier test that allows for the 
endogenous determination of the time and the size of the break at both the level and the trend 
of the data generating process.31  
Consider the following data generating process: 
𝑦 = 𝛿 𝑍 + 𝜀 ,    
   𝜀 = 𝛽𝜀 + 𝑢                                                         (7)   
 
 
31 There are other tests that allow for the determination of time and size of breaks endogenously. For instance, 
there are the tests by Zivot and Andrews (1992), Perron (1997), and Lumsdaine and Papell (1997).  However, all 
these tests suffer from size inaccuracies and tend to reject the null more than expected.  On the contrary, the Lee 
et al. (2012) test is more powerful and it has a more accurate size. See also the tests in Lee and Strazicich (2003, 
2004) for more information. 
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where 𝑍 , is a vector of exogenous variables that define the data generating process. The test 
for unit roots is based on the parameter 𝛽 and the null hypothesis is 𝛽 = 1. To accommodate  
a structural break in the intercept and a change in the slope of the trend, the vector of exogenous 
variables 𝑍  is specified as 𝑍 = [1, 𝑡, 𝐷 , 𝐷𝑇 ] , where 𝐷𝑇 = 𝑡 − 𝑇   for 𝑡 > 𝑇 + 1, and zero 
otherwise. 32 The 𝑇   here denotes the time period when the break occurs. To endogenously 
determine the location of the break, the LM unit-root procedure searches all possible break 
points with minimum unit-root t-test statistic in order to find the greatest lower bound such 
that:33 
𝐼𝑛𝑓 ?̃? 𝜆 = 𝐼𝑛𝑓 𝜏𝜆, where 𝜆 = 𝑇 𝑇⁄                                                                 (8) 
  
The results of the tests for two structural breaks are all reported in Table 3. The t-statistics 
associated with the LM test presented in Column 2 shows that all variables are non-stationary, 
but their first difference is stationary at the 1% significance level. Because the level of the 
variables is I(1) process, we can continue our analysis using the NARDL model without any 
hesitation.  
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 report the dates of structural breaks as determined 
econometrically by the procedure. As can be seen in the table, the levels of the variables break 
at different times across countries. For instance, in 2008, oil prices break in Tunisia and the 
UAE while it breaks in Saudi Arabia only in 2014. Similarly, the industrial output level breaks 
in 2010 in Tunisia, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia while it only breaks in 2012 in Egypt and 
the UAE.  
The breaking dates in the difference of the variables also vary across countries. However, 
the breaks in the change of the industrial output occur in the period of the political turmoil in 
 
32 Needless to say if two structural breaks in the level and the trend, the Z  vector becomes  Z =
[1, t, D1 , D2 , DT1 , DT2 ] , where D1 , and D2   are dummy variables that capture the two breaks.  
33 The critical values of the LM unit root test statistic are tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003, 2012). 
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Egypt in 2011 and it also occurs around the global financial crisis in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, 
and Tunisia.  
In the net oil importer countries such as Egypt and Tunis the breaks of the industrial output 
lag the breaks in the oil price. For example, the change in the oil price breaks at the beginning 
of 2008 and 2014; but the structural break in the change of output occurs around the end of 
these years. A similar pattern is displayed by Saudi Arabia.  
Column 6 and Column 7 displays the Lee-Strazicich unit root tests under a data generating 
process that contains breaks in the levels and the trend. The columns show similar results to 
the ADF unit root test in that the null of unit root is rejected in the time series difference of 
both the oil price and the industrial output. This result is found to be uniform across countries 
at the 5% significance level. Having established that none of the variables is integrated of order 
2, the asymmetric bound-testing approach as proposed by Shin et al. (2014) can performed now 
without any hesitation. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
In the non-linear model we are using we regress on negative and positive changes in the oil 
price. Therefore, we performed the ADF and Lee-Strazicich unit root tests over partial sum 
processes of negative and positive changes of oil price and the other variables in all countries.  
All the variables for all countries have been split into the partial cumulative sum of their 
positive and negative variations in order to run the two unit root tests. 35 We find that positive 
and negative oil price components are nonstationary at the levels and stationary at their first 
differences. We find also the same results for the other variables. Thus, we may conclude that 
the oil prices along with their positive and negative components are predominantly integrated 
 
35 The TDICPS software developed by Hatemi-J and Mustafa (2016) was used to transform the data into 
cumulative partial sums for positive and negative components. 
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and thereby the non-linear model is suitable for our empirical analysis. The results of these two 
tests are presented in Table 1A in Appendix A. 
To further check the suitability of the non-linear specification, we use the BDS test of Brock 
et al. (1996) to detect nonlinearity and serial dependence in our data. The test results indicate 
nonlinearity in all series and it provides further justification for the non-linear specification.36  
   
5. Empirical Findings 
At the start of our analysis, we assess causality between oil price changes and output changes 
in the six MENA countries using a nonparametric Granger causality test as in Bekiros and Diks 
(2008). The test results are presented in Table 4. As expected, changes in the prices of oil 
significantly influence industrial production. The result is significant at the 5% level and it is 
uniform across all countries in the sample.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
As well known, conventional Granger causality test do not account for 
nonlinear/asymmetric causal relationships among the variables. Therefore, following Hatemi-
J (2012), tests for asymmetry causality are conducted here to examine the possibility of 
asymmetric causal relationships between oil price and industrial production. This test allows 
for asymmetry in causality by separate the potential causal impact of positive (negative) shocks 
from the positive (negative) ones. The procedure suggested by Hatemi-J (2012) involves three 
main steps. First, decompose the series under study in positive and negative cumulative sums. 
Second, estimate a vector autoregressive-seemingly unrelated regression (VAR-SUR) model. 
Finally, the asymmetric causality of the running from running from 𝑂𝑃  to 𝐼𝑃  or for any other 
compensations (i.e.,(𝑂𝑃 , 𝐼𝑃 ), (𝑂𝑃 , 𝐼𝑃 ), 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑂𝑃 , 𝐼𝑃 )) can be tested by using a 
 
36  To save on space, these results are not reported but available from the authors upon request.   
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modified version of the Wald statistic. Following Hatemi-J (2012), we employ a bootstrap 
algorithm with leverage corrections in order to produce more accurate critical values.38 
Table 5 shows the results of the asymmetric causality tests between the oil price and 
industrial production in real terms for all countries under study.39 The overall results show a 
pattern of asymmetric causality between oil price and industrial production in all the MENA 
countries, and clearly highlights the importance of accounting for the asymmetry, ignoring 
which, may lead to misleading conclusions. More precisely, asymmetric causality tests confirm 
the causality relationship from oil price to industrial production in negative and positive shocks 
for all countries except for Tunisia. Since Tunisia is net oil importer country, no surprising to 
find evidence that positive (negative) shocks in oil prices cause positive (negative) change in 
its industrial production.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 To appreciate non-linearity and asymmetry we run also two regressions: a static regression 
model and a non- linear asymmetric regression model. The results are presented in Table 6.  
In the static regression, we regress the real industrial production on the oil price, a trend and 
a constant. The assumption is one long-term equilibrium relationship that is linear and 
symmetric. Panel A of Table 6, displays the parameter estimates and the diagnostics of the 
error.40 The table shows that the real oil price has a negative and significant influence on the 
Tunisian industrial production, whereas it positively influences the output of the rest of 
countries. The fit of the model is not bad as the adjusted coefficient of determination is more 
than 50% for all countries. However, the diagnostics of the errors are problematic and they 
indicate that the model does not capture the dynamics of the variables and hence, it is not 
 
38 The technical details of this test can be found in Hatemi-J (2012), Hatemi-J, A. (2014) and Hatemi-J, A. and El-
Khatib Y. (2016).  
39 We use GAUSS codes in to run the test. The authors are grateful to A.Hatemi-J for making available his GAUSS 
codes of this analysis. 
40 To improve the fit, we included a time trend.  
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suitable for inference. The Breusch Godfrey test rejects the null of no serial correlations of the 
residuals and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test rejects the null of homoscedastic errors. 
Similarly, the Ramsey RESET test rejects the suitability of the functional form.  
To enhance the specification, we model the long-term relationship of output as a function 
of positive and negative partial sums. Although the negative and positive sums are linearly 
related to output in the formulation, this linearity is only piecewise and the model is genuinely 
non-linear. Thus, the model allows for asymmetry in the influence of the real price of oil on 
output. Finally, note that this model is not assuming a unique linear relationship that is returned 
to after the perturbation of the system. On the contrary, the relationship is dependent on the 
decomposition of the partial sums of the oil price.41   
The estimates of this static asymmetric specification are displayed in Panel B of Table 6. As 
can be seen in the panel, the fit of the model has improved. The coefficient of determination 
has jumped up in all countries with the exception of the UAE.  
The model’s parameters show that the cumulative increases in oil prices benefit output in 
all countries with the exception of the Tunisian industrial production which expands (contracts) 
after decreases (increases) in the oil price. Tunis is a net importer of oil and this explains the 
negative effect of a hike in the price of energy on its small economy. However, the influence 
of oil on Egypt’s industrial output which is another net importer in the sample is at the stark 
difference. Egypt’s industrial output surprisingly expands after an increase in oil prices and 
contracts after a decrease. But Egypt is different than Tunisia in that it has become a net 
importer of oil only after 2010, whereas Tunisia has been always a net importer over the sample 
 
41 Changed negative and positive partial sums implies another cointegrating relationship. In that sense, the 
cointegrating vector is not unique as in linear relationships.   
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period.42 The result here is consistent with the literature on the impact of oil shocks. The 
economies of oil exporters expand and contract after increases and decreases in the price of oil. 
However, increases in oil hurt the output and the production of net oil importer economies.43     
The Wald statistics which tests for the equality of the coefficients associated with 𝑂𝑃  and  
𝑂𝑃 rejects the null of equal parameters. Hence, the model implies asymmetry in the influence 
of oil shocks on the industrial production. In particular, output expands after cumulative 
increases in the real price of oil more than it contracts after cumulative decreases. For instance, 
a 1% cumulative increase in the real price of oil will increase real industrial production by 
0.24%, -0.07%, 0.12%, 0.14%, 0.13%, 0.13% for Egypt, Tunisia, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
and Qatar respectively. This can be compared with an output response of -0.13%, 0.10%, -
0.07%, -0.08%, -0.006%, and -0.04% that result from a decrease in the oil price of the same 
countries respectively.44 Surprisingly, Egypt’s industrial output is the most sensitive to oil price 
fluctuations among the sample countries.   
Still, this model is not suitable for inference as it does not allow for short-term dynamics 
and the diagnostics of the residuals implies that the model is misspecified. In particular, the 
errors from the model are serially correlated as shown by the Breusch Godfrey test. Hence, the 
dynamics of the data is not fully accounted for. Furthermore, heteroskedastic residuals are not 
rejected and the reset test shows that the specification is not suitable for the variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
42 Tunis produces some oil from El Borma and Ashtart fields, but it imports large proportions of its oil needs from 
Libya. Egypt is different as it produces most of its needs domestically. For instance, in 2017, Egypt has produced 
660 thousand and consumed 816 thousand barrels of oil.  
43 Similar results from the recent literature on the positive impact of oil increases on oil exporter countries can be 
found in Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009), Korhonen and Juurikkala (2009), El Anshasy and Bradely (2012), 
Allegret et al. (2014), and Nusair (2016). 
44 For Tunis, a drop of 1% expands output by 0.1% while an increase of 1% reduces output by 0.05%. Hence, 
Tunisian output is two folds more sensitive to oil price decreases than to increases.  
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Therefore, we proceed to estimate a nonlinear cointegrating autoregressive distributed lag 
model (ARDL) as in Eq. 6. In addition to the long-term relationship and asymmetry, note that 
this specification also accounts for the short-term dynamics of the industrial output, and the 
dynamics of positive and negative changes in the cumulative sums of the oil price. The 
specification also takes care of asymmetry in the influence of positive and negative changes in 
the partial sums of oil prices over the short term. The richness of the specification allows for 
more understanding of long- and short-term association and asymmetry in the oil-output 
association.   
Table 7 presents the parameter estimates, the non-linear cointegration tests of the oil output 
relationship and the diagnostics of the residuals. As can be seen in the table, the model fits data 
very well and it captures its short term as well as its long-term dynamics. The optimal number 
of the lags of partial sums of oil changes and the industrial output is chosen using AIC 
information criteria which have been checked up to max p = max q = 12 and dropping all 
insignificant stationary regressors. 
The table shows that unlike previous models, the residuals here are serially uncorrelated, 
homoscedastic and the functional form appears to be suitable conditional on the data set. 
Therefore, this model is appropriate to make inference on long- and short-term association 
between real oil prices and the industrial output. 
 In terms of a long-term relationship, the table shows that the real industrial output and the 
real oil price are cointegrated in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Tunisia. The 𝑡  test statistics 
rejects the null of no cointegration at the 5% significance level.46 The short-term changes of 
industrial production are influenced by the deviation of output from the long-term relationship 
 
46 As mentioned previously here we test the null of 𝜌 = 0 against the alternative of 𝜌 < 0 in 2.5. The parameter 
𝜌 is the adjustment speed parameter that is associated with the error correction term in the non-linear ARDL 
model.    
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between industrial production and partial sums of the real oil price. The same result is inferred 
from the 𝐹  bounds test of Pesaran, Shin and Smith. The two countries that are found with 
weak cointegration evidence are Egypt and Kuwait. 
The estimated long-term non-linear relationship has similar characteristics across countries. 
Output increases and decreases with the increases and the decreases in the oil price. However, 
the output is more sensitive to oil price rallies than to oil price falls. The estimated long -term 
response of industrial production to a 1% increase in the partial sum of positive changes in the 
real oil price is 0.40%, -0.38%, 0.42%, 0.40%, 0.32%, 0.17% for Egypt, Tunisia, UAE, Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar respectively. This can be compared with an output response of -
0.15%, 0.09%, -0.07%, -0.24%, -0.21%, -0.14% and -0.10% that result from a decrease in the 
oil price of the same countries respectively. The positive long-term influence of oil price rallies 
seems to be greater in the longer term than the negative influence of oil price falls.  
The short-term parameters of the influence of changes in the oil price are also significant 
particularly when there is an increase in the oil price. There is a contemporaneous influence of 
oil on the real output of net exporters of the MENA region. The influence is significant during 
increases as well as decreases in the real price of oil. Occasionally, the partial sums of the 
previous changes in the oil price do influence current real industrial production. For instance, 
oil price positive and negative changes at two lags seem to be significant in Saudi Arabia. 
Similarly, negative changes in partial sums of the real oil price at four lags negatively influence 
the industrial production of Kuwait and positively influence the industrial production of 
Tunisia.  
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
Tables 6 & & also report the results of the control variables. According to the estimated 
results, we can find that the changes of the real interest rate have significantly negative effects 
on industrial production of all MENA countries, thus indicating that a higher interest rate 
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results in lower output. The effects of the real inflation rate are mainly positive, thus implying 
that the rise in the inflation leads to the rise in industrial production. These finding is roughly 
in line with previous literature.    
The long- and short-term asymmetry tests are included in Table 8. The table shows that there 
is substantial asymmetry in the response of the real industrial output in the MENA region to 
the oil prices in both the short as well as the long term. This result is significant and uniform 
across all countries. The only exception is the response of Tunisian industrial output which 
seems to be symmetric, but only in the short run. The economic players in the MENA region 
are quick to increase their spending and investments following oil price increases but hesitate 
to reduce it following oil declines. 
 
A potential explanation of asymmetry lies in the behavior of Governments in the oil exporter 
countries of the MENA region. These countries have public budgets that are balanced at a 
relatively low price of oil. For instance, Kuwait’s budget is balanced when the barrel of oil is 
priced at $49.1, whereas Saudi Arabia’s and UAE’s budgets are balanced when the barrel of 
oil is $83.8 and $67 respectively.50 The excess revenues due to higher oil prices flow to the 
country’s sovereign wealth funds which are mainly invested in the US and Europe.51 However, 
when oil prices are low, these funds liquidate assets in order to support the current level of 
public spending. In that sense, the sovereign wealth funds play an important role in the stability 
of public spending and the economy when oil prices are low. Therefore, a drop in the oil price 
will not have its toll on the economy.52  
[INSERT TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
50 Source: Fitch, High Mark Capital, Capital, IWF, WSJ.  
51 These funds are owned by the government. Their time horizon is multigenerational and their objective is to 
grow and to pass the benefits of oil revenues through to future generations.   
52 Note that domestic oil prices are controlled and hence, the adjustment effect in minor. 
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However, following increases in the oil price, additional resources will be transferred from 
oil importer countries to oil exporter countries. These revenues support higher levels of public 
spending, investments, output, and growth. The higher oil price will also induce more public 
and private investments in the oil and the gas sectors due to the now higher expected returns. 
As domestic oil prices are not changing, there will be hardly any sectoral allocation adjustments 
in either labor, capital or even investment as a response to the increase in global oil prices.53 
Moreover, the high prices of oil will reduce uncertainty regarding the future of government 
revenues, spending, economic growth, and jobs. This, in turn, stimulates more private 
investment and spending. Therefore, increases in oil prices strongly influence output expansion 
in MENA countries.54  
As mentioned previously, an important feature of the non-linear ARDL model is the 
possibility to observe the adjustment paths of the real industrial production due to positive and 
negative shocks in the real oil price. The adjustment paths capture the dynamics of the real 
industrial production as it moves from its initial equilibrium to the new one following a shock 
to the oil price. Figure 3 depicts how the cumulative dynamic multipliers of output are changing 
across time following positive and negative oil shocks.55  
The Figure contains three lines and a band. The green line shows how the equilibrium is 
adjusting to an increase in the oil price. The red line depicts the response to a drop in the prices 
of oil. The blue middle line is the line that shows asymmetry in the adjustment of equilibrium 
to positive and negative changes in oil prices. The line offsets the impact on the equilibrium of 
 
53 The only potential adjustment is the reallocation of resources into the energy sector as it is now more profitable 
due to higher oil prices.  
54 Note that in the literature, there is a strong evidence that falls in oil prices are unlikely to initiate an expansion, 
while rises are likely to trigger recessions. See Kilian and Vigfusson (2011), Kilian (2008), Hamilton (2009), 
Edelstein and Kilian (2009) among many others.   
55 Recall that these multipliers are the summation of infinitesimal responses of the real industrial output to changes 
in positive and negative cumulative sums of the real oil price across time. The multipliers converge to the long-
term response parameters as the time period becomes very long.    
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similar positive and negative shocks to the cumulative sums of oil prices. The location of the 
line should be around zero if the real output responds symmetrically to changes in the oil prices. 
Finally, the cloud band around the line is the 90% confidence interval which we have generated 
by bootstrapping the sample positive and negative cumulative sums of the real oil prices, and 
then estimating the dynamic multiplier and offsetting it at various horizons.     
 In Figure 3, the positive (negative) oil price shock has a positive (negative) impact on the 
output of oil exporters and Egypt, but a negative impact only on Tunisia.  Moreover, Figure 3 
clearly shows that the influence of increases in the oil price on the industrial output is higher 
than the influence of oil price decreases. The blue line and its confidence interval are always 
above zero and for all countries. The degree of asymmetry is similar across oil exporters but it 
is slight for Egypt. In Tunisia, there is a slight asymmetry in the opposite direction. 
Figure 3 also shows that the adjustment to a drop in the oil price in the oil exporter countries 
takes a longer time than the adjustment in oil importers: around 60 months, 40 months, and 20 
months are needed for the industrial output to reach its new equilibrium in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, and the UAE respectively. However, equilibrium is attained within one year in Egypt 
and Tunisia.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Although the same applies to the changes in industrial production as a result of an increase 
in the oil price, the adjustment is slower as it occurs over longer periods of time. Notice that 
the green lines in oil exporter countries are concave while the red lines are convex. These lines 
indicate that while the industrial production drops fast as a result of a negative oil shock it 
increases slowly in response to positive shocks. In the oil importer countries, adjustments are 
faster and they occur within one year.     
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A possible explanation of this slow adjustments is that oil exporters are rich and own large 
financial reserves that are tapped when necessary in order to support and stabilize their 
economies in the face oil price decreases. The poor economies of Egypt and Tunisia have to 
absorb the shocks very quickly by reducing their industrial outputs. 
The upshot here is that output is more stable and its adjustments are slower in the oil exporter 
countries of the MENA region. Moreover, the output increases at a slower pace when oil prices 
increase, but it drops at a relatively faster rate when oil prices decrease.   
6.  Robustness analysis  
To see if the inference is able to stand a change in the data generating process, we estimate 
the bivariate nonlinear VAR model of Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a, b) and then test for 
asymmetry in the responses of the real industrial output to oil price changes.   
Specially, we estimate the following structural model using 12 monthly lags:56 
𝑂𝑃 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛼 , 𝑂𝑃 +   ∑ 𝛼 , 𝐼𝑃 + 𝜀 ,                                                (9)                                 
𝐼𝑃 = 𝛼 + 𝛼 , 𝑂𝑃 +    𝛼 , 𝐼𝑃 + 𝛾 , 𝑂𝑃 + 𝜀 ,     (10) 
where 𝑂𝑃  is the maximum real price of oil in the previous 12 months i.e., 𝑂𝑃 =
max (𝑂𝑃 , 0); 𝜀 ,  and 𝜀 ,  are serially uncorrelated disturbances with zero mean. An OLS 
estimator of the two-equation model above is consistent and efficient. The presence of 
asymmetry can be inferred by testing the null that the slope coefficients corresponding to 𝑂𝑃  
are all equal zero; i.e. 𝐻 : 𝛾 , = 𝛾 , = 0 for all 𝑖. This slope-based Wald test is 
asymptotically distributed as 𝜒 .  Table 9 displays the slope-based test results using 12 lags. 
 
56 In the literature, there is no guide to the number of lags that are adequate to capture the dynamics in the oil-
output VAR relationship. However, many studies have gone back one year (Hamilton and Herrera, 2004; Jiménez-
Rodríguez and Sánchez,2005; Herrera et al., 2011; Herrera et al., 2015; Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011a, b).     
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The Wald test rejects the null that the corresponding parameters of the maximum of the oil 
price changes are equivalent and equals to zero at the 0.01% significance level in all countries. 
Thus, the asymmetry in the response of output to oil changes is more likely.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 HERE] 
To see if the paths of the response of real output to oil price changes are symmetric, we use 
a test statistic that is based on 10,000 bootstrap simulations of impulse response functions of 
Equations 9 and 10. The null hypothesis is written as  
𝐻 ∶ 𝐼𝑅𝐹 (ℎ, 𝛿) = −𝐼𝑅𝐹 (ℎ, −𝛿) 
where the 𝐼𝑅𝐹  above is the impulse responses of output to oil shocks. These impulses are 
functions of the horizon, ℎ that extends from 0,1, … , 𝐻 , and of the size of oil shock which is 
referred to as 𝛿.  Under the null, a Wald test statistics has an asymptotic distribution of  𝜒 (𝐻 +
1) and thus, it can be used to assess  symmetry in the responses of output at various horizons.   
Table 10 reports the p-values of the test of symmetry in the impulse response of industrial 
production to shocks in oil for horizons that extends forward from two months to one year. The   
test is conducted for one and two standard error 𝜎 shocks in the oil price. As can be seen in the 
table, the impulse responses are not symmetric for relatively large shocks in the oil price. This 
result is significant and uniform across all countries. However, when the shock size is relatively 
small, the null of symmetry is only rejected for short horizons.57 Over longer horizons that 
extends beyond 8 months, responses in output to positive and negative one standard error 
shocks in oil are likely to be equivalent. The exception is Saudi Arabia which shows 
pronounced asymmetry for shocks of various magnitude in the oil price and over all horizons.     
 
57 The Tunisian industrial output to small shocks in oil seems to be symmetric for all horizons. 
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The graphical representation of impulse-responses for various positive shock sizes is 
displayed in Figure 4.   
[INSERT TABLE 10 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 
7. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this research, we provide recent evidence on the asymmetric influence of oil price changes 
on the industrial output of five MENA countries. The paper contributes to the literature in 
various ways: first, it provides evidence from a relatively larger sample compared to the related 
literature. The industrial production is used to proxy output in order to get more observations; 
Second, it uses a non -linear model that accounts for asymmetries and non-linearities in the 
relationship between oil and output; Third, it estimates a sample that contains three big net oil 
exporters and hence, it provides evidence on the nature of asymmetry in net oil exporter 
countries whereas most of the literature’s interest lies on net oil importers.        
The results that we obtain are interesting and intuitive. First, we find that growth in MENA 
countries is linked to oil in the sense that it benefits from higher oil prices and it gets hurt by a 
fall in the oil market. Moreover, there is pronounced short- and long-term asymmetries in the 
influence of oil on output. In particular, the output is faster to respond to increases in oil prices 
than to decreases. The long-term influence to a rise in the oil price is also higher although it is 
realized over a longer period.  
Theoretically, oil price fluctuation in either direction should create uncertainties and 
economic reallocation costs that worsen the bad influence of a drop in the oil price and 
moderate the good influence of oil market rises. However, our results are not supportive of this 
theory as we find asymmetry in the opposite direction. This has been explained by the increase 
in confidence and certainty in the MENA region following rises in the price of oil. It can also 
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be explained by the vast amount of resources invested in the sovereign wealth funds and these 
are used in order to support public spending in periods of extended falls in the oil price.  
The findings in this paper are important for politicians and policy makers in the MENA 
region. First, the oil price plays a crucial role in the long- and short-term economic performance 
of countries. When prices are high, economies grow and perform. But the danger to this growth 
and employment lies when the oil price falls. As governments in the region monopolize the 
production and the distribution of oil, the first shock will hit public revenues and then it spreads 
across the economy. Therefore, these countries should set up policies that hedge against drops 
in the oil market in order to moderate its effects on the domestic economy. For instance, 
governments in the MENA region may buy insurance against oil price falls when it is 
expected.58 Similarly, there should be some regulations on oil sensitive businesses that 
incentivize them to explicitly discuss and adopt a risk management strategy against energy 
price fluctuations. Furthermore, attempts to engage in long term contracts to supply oil when 
prices are relatively high may also help stabilize the MENA economies. 
The idea of diversifying government revenues away from oil seems to be crucial. The 
current situation is budgets that depend on oil revenues and an extremely light tax regime. The 
diversified sources of revenues reduce the influence of oil price falls as well as rises on public 
spending. This can be done by diversifying the economy itself and by restructuring the whole 
of the tax regime in order to fit for that purpose.  
The establishment of sovereign wealth funds is an intelligent idea that can be also used to 
promote a stable macroeconomic environment against volatile energy markets. Therefore, 
these funds should be encouraged and staffed with more resources. However, these funds 
should be mandated to support the economy against oil price volatility. This is important as the 
 
58 These can be bought in the international markets as put options or OTC bespoke insurance contracts.   
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mandate will influence the management of assets such that these funds will assume exposures 
to perform better when oil prices are low. This can be done by an allocation which is weakly 
correlated with energy markets.   
 The government in oil exporter countries should be aware of the asymmetries in the 
response of domestic output to oil price shocks. For instance, when prices increase and 
confidence rise, governments should expect domestic spending and output to increase at the 
current level of public spending. Therefore, if the government increases its spending, the 
economy may overheat and prices may start to increase. Therefore, governments should decide 
on their additional budget after seeing how the economy is growing. The additional funds could 
be invested in the sovereign wealth funds in order to support spending during periods of oil 
price falls.    
In the oil importer countries of the MENA region, hedging the fluctuation of oil prices and 
increasing dependence on clean energy sources is paramount to protect government budgets 
and to stabilize and grow the economies. In these countries, a national strategy that aims to 
increase dependence on clean energy sources is crucial for the future development of these 
countries. Accounting for energy risk in government and corporate strategies is also important. 
These countries are also encouraged to contract their energy needs long term when the oil prices 
are low.          
  
Appendix A 






Akoum I, Graham M, Kivihaho J, Nikkinen J, Omran M. Co-movement of oil and stock prices 
in the GCC region: A wavelet analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 
2012;52: 385-94. 
Allegret J.-P., Couharde C, Coulibaly D, Mignon V. Current accounts and oil price fluctuations 
in oil-exporting countries: the role of financial development.  Journal of International Money 
and Finance 2014; 47:185-201. 
Arouri M. E. H., Rault C. Causal relationships between oil and stock prices: Some new 
evidence from gulf oil-exporting countries. International Economics 2010;122: 41-56. 
Awartani B, Maghyereh A. I. Dynamic spillovers between oil and stock markets in the Gulf 
Cooperation Council Countries. Energy Economics 2013; 36: 28-42. 
Awartani B, Javed F, Maghyereh A, Virkd N. Time-varying transmission between oil and 
equities in the MENA region: New evidence from DCC-MIDAS analyses. Review of 
Development Finance 2018; 8: 116-126.  
Balke N. S., Brown S. P., Yücel M. K. Oil price shocks and the US economy: Where does the 
asymmetry originate?. The Energy Journal 2002; 23: 7-52. 
Banerjee A, Dolado J, Mestre R. Error-correction mechanism tests for cointegration in a single-
equation framework. Journal of time series analysis 1988; 19: 267-83. 
Baumeister C, Kilian L. Lower oil prices and the U.S. economy: is this time different?’ Brook. 
Pap. Econ. Act. 2016 (2), 287–357 (Brookings Institution Press). 
Baumeister C, Kilian L,  Zhou X. Is the discretionary income effect of oil price shocks a hoax?. 
Energy Journal 2018; 39 (S12): 117–137. 
Baumeister C.J., Hamilton J.D. Structural interpretation of vector autoregressions with 
incomplete identification: revisiting the role of oil supply and demand shocks. American 
Economic Review 2019; 109: 1873-1910. 
Bekiros S.D., Diks, G.G.H. The nonlinear Dynamic Relationship of Exchange Rates: 
Parametric and Nonparametric Causality Testing. Energy Economics 2018; 30: 2673-2685. 
Bernanke B. S. Irreversibility, uncertainty, and cyclical investment. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1983; 98: 85-106. 
Bernanke B. S., Gertler M, Watson M, Sims C. A., Friedman B. M., Systematic monetary 
policy and the effects of oil price shocks, Brookings papers on economic activity 1997; 1: 91-
157. 
Cologni A,  Manera M. Exogenous oil shocks, fiscal policies and sector reallocations in oil 
producing countries. Energy Economics 2013; 35: 42-57. 
Diks C, Panchenko V. A new statistic and practical guidelines for nonparametric Granger 
causality testing. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 2006; 30: 1647-1669. 
Edelstein  P,  Kilian L. How sensitive are consumer expenditures to retail energy prices?'. 
Journal of Monetary Economics 2009; 56: 766-79. 
El Anshasy A. A., Bradley, M. D. Oil prices and the fiscal policy response in oil-exporting 
countries. Journal of Policy Modeling; 2012; 34: 605-20. 
34 
 
Elder J, Serletis A. Oil price uncertainty. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 2010;42: 1137-
59. 
Farzanegan M. R., Markwardt G. The effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy. 
Energy Economics 2009; 31: 134-51. 
Hamilton JD, Herrera AM. Oil shocks and aggregate macroeconomic behavior: The role of 
monetary policy: comment. Journal of Money Credit Bank 2004; 36:265–86 
Hamilton J. D. A neoclassical model of unemployment and the business cycle. Journal of 
Political Economy 1988; 96: 593–617.  
Hamilton J. D. Causes and consequences of the oil shock of 2007–08. Brookings papers on 
economic activity, Economic studies program, the Brookings Institution 2009; 40: 215-83. 
Hatemi-J A, Mustafa A. A MS-Excel module to transform an integrated variable into 
cumulative partial sums for negative and positive components with and without deterministic 
trend parts. MPRA Paper 2016; No 73813, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
Hatemi-J A. Asymmetric causality tests with an application. Empirical Economics, 2012; 43: 
447-456. 
Hatemi-J A. Asymmetric generalized impulse responses with an application in finance. 
Economic Modelling 2014; 36(C): 18-22. 
Hatemi-J A, El-Khatib Y. An extension of the asymmetric causality tests for dealing with 
deterministic trend components. Applied Economics 2016; 48: 4033-4041. 
Herrera A.M, Lagalo LG, Wada T. Oil price shocks and industrial production: is the 
relationship linear? Macroeconomic Dynamics 2011; 15:472–497. 
Herrera A.M, Lagalo LG, Wada T. Asymmetries in the response of economic activity to oil 
price increases and decreases? Journal of International Money and Finance 2015; 50:108–133 
Herrera A.M, Karaki M.B, Rangaraju S.K. Oil price shocks and U.S. economic activity. Energy 
Policy 2019; 129: 89-99. 
Herrera A.M., Lagalo L. G, Wada T. Asymmetries in the response of economic activity to oil 
price increases and decreases?. Journal of International Money and Finance 2015; 50: 108-33. 
Herrera A.M, Lagalo L. G, Wada, T. Oil price shocks and industrial production: Is the 
relationship linear?. Macroeconomic Dynamics 2011;15 (S3): 472-97. 
Hiemstra C, Jones J. Testing for linear and nonlinear Granger causality in the stock price-
volume relation. Journal of Finance 1994; 49: 1639–1664. 
Jouini J, Harrathi N. Revisiting the shock and volatility transmissions among GCC stock and 
oil markets: A further investigation. Economic Modelling 2014; 38: 486-94. 
Kilian L, Vigfusson RJ. Nonlinearities in the oil price-output relationship. Macroeconomic 
Dynamics  2011a; 15: 337–363 
Kilian L, Vigfusson RJ. Are the responses of the US economy asymmetric in energy price 
increases and decreases? Quantitative Economics 2011b; 2:419–453. 
35 
 
Kilian L, Vigfusson RJ. Do oil prices help forecast us real gdp? the role of nonlinearities and 
asymmetries.  Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 2013; 31: 78–93. 
Kilian L, Vigfusson RJ. Pitfalls in estimating asymmetric effects of energy price shocks. 
Working Paper 7284, 2009, CEPR. [436, 437]. 
Kilian L. The economic effects of energy price shocks. Journal of Economic Literature 2008;  
46: 871-909. 
Korhonen I, Juurikkala T. Equilibrium exchange rates in oil-exporting countries. Journal of 
Economics and Finance 2009; 33:71-79. 
Lee J,  Strazicich M.C. Minimum lagrange multiplier unit root test with two structural breaks. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 2003; 85(4):1082-1089. 
Lee J, Strazicich M.C.  Minimum  LM unit root test with one structural break.  Working Paper 
2004, http://econ.appstate.edu/RePEc/pdf/wp0417.pdf 
Lee J, Strazicich M.C,  Meng M. Two-step LM unit root tests with trend-breaks. Journal of 
Statistical and Econometric Methods 2012; 1 (2): 81-107. 
Lumsdaine R. L., Papell D.H. Multiple trend breaks and the unit root hypothesis. Review of 
Economics and Statistics 1997; 79(2): 212-18. 
Maghyereh A, Al‐Kandari A. Oil prices and stock markets in GCC countries: new evidence 
from nonlinear cointegration analysis. Managerial Finance 2007; 33: 449-460.  
Maghyereh A, Awartani B. Oil price uncertainty and equity returns: Evidence from oil 
importing and exporting countries in the MENA region. Journal of Financial Economic Policy 
2016; 8: 64-79. 
Maghyereh A, Awartani B, Sweidan O.D. Asymmetric responses of economic growth to daily 
oil price changes: New global evidence from mixed-data sampling approach. UAE University 
working paper, 2018.  
Maghyereh A, Awartani B, Sweidan O.D. Oil price uncertainty and real output growth: new 
evidence from selected oil-importing countries in the Middle East. Empirical Economics 2019; 
56: 1601–162. 
Mehrara M. The asymmetric relationship between oil revenues and economic activities: The 
case of oil-exporting countries. Energy Policy 2008; 36:1164-68. 
Moshiri S, Banihashem A. Asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on economic growth of oil-
exporting countries’. USAEE Working Paper No. 12-140., 2012, Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2163306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163306 
Nazlioglu S. World oil and agricultural commodity prices: Evidence from nonlinear causality. 
Energy Policy 2011; 39: 2935–2943. 
Nusair S. A. The effects of oil price shocks on the economies of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
countries: Nonlinear analysis. Energy Policy 2016; 91: 256-67. 




Perron P. Further evidence on breaking trend functions in macroeconomic variables. Journal 
of Econometrics 1997; 80(2): 355-85. 
Pesaran M.H, Shin Y. An autoregressive distributed-lag modelling approach to cointegration 
analysis', in S. Strøm ed, Econometrics and Economic Theory in the 20th Century: The Ragnar 
Frisch Centennial Symposium (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
Pesaran M. H, Shin Y, Smith R. J. Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level 
relationships. Journal of applied econometrics 2001; 16: 289-326. 
Schorderet Y. Revisiting Okun's Law: An hysteretic perspective. University of California at 
San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2fb7n2wd 2001, Department of Economics, 
UC San Diego.  
Shin Y, Yu B, Greenwood-Nimmo M. Modelling asymmetric cointegration and dynamic 
multipliers in a nonlinear ARDL framework', in S. R. and H. W. eds, Festschrift in Honor of 
Peter Schmidt (Springer, 2014): 281-314. 
Zivot Z,  Andrews D.W.K. Further evidence on the great crash, the oil price shock, and the unit 























Table 1: Descriptive statistics of level variables 
 Mean Std. dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Real industrial production (IP)      
Egypt 10.993 0.084 1.304 3.365 26.015*** 
Tunisia 9.343 0.036 0.111 2.800 0.470 
UAE 10.809 0.043 -0.301 2.198 4.442 
Saudi Arabia 11.102 0.038 0.632 2.814 8.093** 
Kuwait 9.399 0.039 -0.502 2.214 5.957* 
Qatar 9.964 0.043 -0.688 2.301 9.333*** 
Real oil prices (OP)      
Egypt 3.012 0.153 -1.088 2.999 18.171*** 
Tunisia 2.197 0.121 -0.666 2.643 10.231*** 
UAE 2.470 0.165 -0.384 1.915 9.292*** 
Saudi Arabia 2.488 0.166 -0.456 2.320 7.495** 
Kuwait 1.357 0.151 -0.624 1.982 11.673*** 
Qatar 2.466 0.160 -0.922 2.498 14.307*** 
Real inflation rate (INF)      
Egypt 0.010 0.011 0.653 4.326 13.272*** 
Tunisia 0.004 0.003 0.083 2.887 0.217 
UAE 0.002 0.004 1.623 10.206 327.943*** 
Saudi Arabia 0.003 0.005 3.116 20.379 1974.129*** 
Kuwait 0.002 0.003 1.042 4.142 25.401*** 
Qatar 0.001 0.004 -0.529 4.914 22.530*** 
Real interest rate (R)      
Egypt 0.079 0.032 1.475 4.098 38.003*** 
Tunisia 0.042 0.006 -0.221 3.577 2.840 
UAE 0.047 0.006 0.063 3.772 3.213 
Saudi Arabia 0.007 0.014 1.778 6.233 133.731*** 
Kuwait 0.046 0.005 0.241 3.624 2.801 
Qatar 0.053 0.012 0.918 3.036 15.890*** 
Note: The values in parentheses are p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
















Table 2: Unit root tests with constant and linear trend, t-stat. (ADF, automatic lag length, max = 12) 
 Level First Difference Second Difference 
Real industrial production (IP)       
Egypt -2.763 (0.214) -8.538** (0.000)   
Tunisia -4.908*** (0.000) -4.491*** (0.002)   
UAE -2.885 (0.171) -18.151*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -2.505 (0.325) -2.786 (0.205) -8.198*** (0.000) 
Kuwait -1.695 (0.744) -2.291 (0.433) -4.835*** (0.001) 
Qatar 1.926 (0.999) -3.367** (0.015)   
Real oil prices (OP)       
Egypt -1.989 (0.598) -6.851*** (0.000)   
Tunisia -2.583 (0.288) -8.370*** (0.000)   
UAE -2.549 (0.304) -7.424*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -3.098 (0.110) -8.000*** (0.000)   
Kuwait -2.134 (0.520) -7.875*** (0.000)   
Qatar -3.242* (0.081) -8.481*** (0.000)   
Real inflation rate (INF)       
Egypt -7.061*** (0.000) -7.762*** (0.000)   
Tunisia -3.551** (0.038) -11.536***  (0.000)   
UAE -8.291*** (0.000) -7.937*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -10.773*** (0.000) -9.723*** (0.000)   
Kuwait -5.759*** (0.000) -7.113*** (0.000)   
Qatar -8.647*** (0.000) -9.944*** (0.000)   
Real interest rate (R)       
Egypt -2.791 (0.204) -11.904*** (0.000)   
Tunisia -1.967 (0.613) -4.094*** (0.008)   
UAE -6.343*** (0.000) -7.459*** (0.000)   
Saudi Arabia -3.654** (0.029) -14.001*** (0.000)   
Kuwait -2.362 (0.396) -5.758*** (0.000)   
Qatar -1.665 (0.760) -12.985*** (0.000)   
Notes: H0: ln(variable) has a unit root. Critical values are -4.063, -3.460, and 3.156 for 1%, 5% and 10% level. The values in parentheses 
are p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 





Table 3: Lee-Strazicich two-break unit-root test  
 T-statistic Selected lag Time break 1 Time break 2 DU1 DU2 DT1 DT2 
Egypt        
Level        
IP -4.570 5 2012:10 2013:7 -0.200 (-2.275) 0.082 (0.877) -0.200 (5.660) -0.145* (-1.729) 
OP -5.749* 8 2010:10 2012:10 -0.097*** (-5.345) 0.138*** (5.988) 0.036 (0.886) -0.060* (-1.339) 
INF -6.845** 2 2015:4 2017:7 -0.020*** (-5.419) -0.009** (-2.546) 0.022** (2.225) -0.011 (-1.149) 
R -6.190* 8 2015:7 2017:3 0.000 (0.071) 0.027*** (3.993) 0.018 (1.590) -0.015 (-1.244) 
First Difference        
∆IP -12.929*** 7 2012:10 2013:5 -0.271*** (-4.944) 0.295*** (4.011) 0.564*** (7.366) -0.141*** (-3.763) 
∆OP -7.144*** 2 2011:2 2013:4 0.058*** (4.522) 0.011 (0.819) -0.128** (-2.786) -0.097** (-2.164) 
∆INF -9.842*** 1 2013:8 2017:5 0.017*** (5.464) -0.053*** (-8.101) -0.025** (-2.091) 0.076*** (5.808) 
∆R -10.331*** 1 2013:3 2016:11 -0.034*** (-8.060) 0.062*** (9.122) 0.059*** (4.656) -0.068***  (-5.339) 
Tunisia        
Level        
IP -4.409 6 2010:1 2015:12 -0.029 (-1.812) 0.032 (1.295) 0.063** (2.957) -0.034* (-1.703) 
OP -5.317* 2 2008:6 2014:1 0.019** (2.071) -0.055*** (-4.380) -0.010 (-0.298) -0.050 (-1.427) 
INF -6.575*** 6 2010:10 2014:7 -0.005***  (-5.267) 0.007*** (6.193) 0.008*** (3.206) -0.011*** (-4.030) 
R -4.850 6 2012:8 2015:10 0.003** (3.437) -0.007*** (-4.164) -0.006* (1.691) 0.010** (2.715) 
First Difference        
∆IP -9.212*** 11 2008:11 2014:9 0.091*** (9.017) -0.100*** (-9.586) -0.120*** (-5.541) 0.109*** (5.236) 
∆OP -7.545*** 2 2008:1 2014:3 -0.072*** (-4.697) 0.049*** (5.432) 0.250*** (7.301) -0.090** (-2.437) 
∆INF -11.916*** 4 2014:11 2015:6 -0.005*** (-4.442) 0.011*** (7.423) 0.006** (2.143) -0.005 (-1.919) 
∆R -8.441*** 5 2013:8 2015:9 0.007*** (6.103) -0.023*** (-8.544) -0.014** (-3.751) 0.028*** (6.451) 
UAE         
Level        
IP -5.336* 5 2008:8 2012:5 0.002 (0.467) -0.015*** (-3.201) 0.015 (0.748) 0.056** (2.642) 
OP -5.505* 2 2008:3 2013:10 0.038*** (3.637) -0.062*** (-4.760) -0.007 (-0.198) -0.049* (-1.414) 
INF -7.586*** 5 2009:1 2015:9 0.008*** (4.989) -0.005*** (-5.176) -0.015*** (-3.675) -0.001 (0.358) 
R -5.981** 7 2011:3 2016:10 -0.004*** (-4.127) 0.010*** (5.608) -0.001 (-0.258) -0.015*** (-3.609) 
First Difference        
∆IP -11.047*** 1 2007:12 2009:10 -0.120*** (-8.829) 0.037*** (5.888) 0.155*** (6.462) -0.004 (-0.182) 
∆OP -7.388*** 5 2008:1 2015:6 0.104*** (5.348) 0.023** (2.579) -0.116** (-2.790) 0.022 (0.611) 
∆INF -9.798*** 7 2015:5 2016:4 -0.017*** (8.705) 0.034*** (9.946) 0.023*** (4.581) -0.038*** (-6.772) 
∆R -10.050*** 5 2015:11 2016:8 -0.025*** (-9.080) 0.027*** (8.772) 0.032*** (5.777) -0.035*** (-6.496) 





Table 3: (continued) 
 T-statistic Selected lag Time break 1 Time break 2 DU1 DU2 DT1 DT2 
Saudi Arabia        
Level         
IP -4.866 5 2010:1 2012:9 0.022** (2.552) -0.033** (-3.112) -0.065* (-1.940) 0.028 (1.021) 
OP -5.378* 2 2014:10 2015:8 -0.046*** (-3.845) 0.029** (2.358) 0.009 (0.262) 0.061* (1.781) 
INF -9.791*** 1 2008:1 2009:6 0.001 (0.566) 0.000 (0.178) -0.003 (-0.702) 0.005 (1.098) 
R -5.789** 5 2008:1 2009:4 -0.014*** (-4.299) -0.008** (-3.400) 0.008 (1.404) 0.007 (1.363) 
First Difference        
∆IP -9.035*** 9 2012:12 2015:1 0.063*** (7.915) -0.128*** (-8.820) -0.100*** (-4.991) 0.184*** (8.176) 
∆OP -8.091*** 2 2008:7 2009:2 -0.126*** (-5.182) 0.055*** (3.281) 0.086** (2.191) -0.075** (-2.137) 
∆INF -14.025*** 1 2008:2 2010:5 0.012*** (5.682) -0.016*** (-9.526) -0.014** (-2.323) 0.022*** (3.774) 
∆R -13.632*** 1 2010:6 2014:8 -0.019** (-9.931) 0.013*** (8.538) 0.024*** (3.967) -0.012** (-1.996) 
Kuwait        
Level        
IP -4.588 8 2008:6 2010:11 0.027*** (3.944) -0.030*** (-4.448) -0.046*** (-3.125) 0.037** (2.255) 
OP -4.990 2 2012:3 2013:10 -0.119*** (-4.027) 0.054** (2.456) 0.048 (1.438) -0.008 (-0.305) 
INF -8.219*** 7 2010:7 2016:5 0.004*** (3.898) -0.012*** (-7.933) -0.011*** (-4.122) 0.017*** (5.751) 
R -5.458 7 2011:1 2013:4 0.004*** (3.252) 0.006*** (4.873) 0.002 (0.617) -0.013*** (-4.510) 
First Difference        
∆IP -9.507*** 11 2009:4 2010:10 0.056*** (9.170) -0.078*** (-10.251) -0.114*** (-8.699) 0.087*** (5.856) 
∆OP -8.067*** 2 2012:6 2013:5 -0.073*** (-5.287) 0.010*** (2.936) 0.128*** (3.488) -0.016** (-2.548) 
∆INF -12.636*** 7 2012:5 2016:7 -0.028*** (-11.511) 0.017*** (8.518) 0.033*** (8.841) -0.009** (-2.644) 
∆R -11.448*** 7 2012:10 2013:12 0.021*** (10.197) -0.004*** (-3.052) -0.029*** (7.920) -0.002 (-0.587) 
Qatar        
Level        
IP -6.970 5 2011:11 2015:1 -0.0126*** (-3.163) 0.0201*** (4.065) 0.011 (0.743) -0.071***  (-4.295) 
OP -4.002 1 2014:12 2015:9 -0.048** (-2.951) -0.015 (-1.087) -0.079** (-2.224) 0.006 (0.191) 
INF -9.744*** 2 2009:11 2010:2 0.001 (0.632) -0.009*** (-3.106) -0.004 (-0.827) 0.006* (1.703) 
R -5.458 2 2010:11 2017:5 -0.007*** (-4.411) 0.014*** (5.276) 0.004 (1.008) -0.018*** (-3.825) 
First Difference        
∆IP -11.027*** 5 2010:8 2015:1 -0.163*** (-8.893) -0.074*** (-6.511) 0.052** (2.447) 0.255*** (10.668) 
∆OP -8.569*** 2 2009:12 2010:7 -0.055 (-3.037) 0.021 (1.516) 0.055 (1.468) -0.015 (-0.428) 
∆INF -13.351*** 1 2010:5 2016:4 -0.014*** (-8.546) -0.012*** (-8.841) 0.017*** (3.766) 0.020*** (4.517) 
∆R -13.918*** 1 2010:9 2011:7 0.014*** (6.491) 0.017*** (8.314) -0.015*** (-3.111) -0.026*** (-5.514) 
Notes: H0: ln(Variable) has a unit root. Critical values are -5.847, -5.332, and -5.064 for 1%, 5% and 10% level. The number of lags was set at maximum 12. The values in parentheses are t-
statistics. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 




Table 4: Diks–Panchenko nonparametric Granger causality test 
   𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃 𝐼𝑃 ≠> 𝑂𝑃 
Country Test Statistic  Test Statistic  
Egypt 1.749** (0.040) 1.119 (0.131) 
Tunisia 2.322** (0.037) 0.642 (0.260) 
UAE 2.602** (0.024) 1.194 (0.116) 
Saudi Arabia 3.312** (0.014) 1.251 (0.105) 
Kuwait 2.467** (0.032) 1.170 (0.120) 
Qatar 2.154 (0.015) 0.994 (0.160) 
Note: The symbol “≠>” implies no Granger-causality. The optimal Embedding dimension = 2. The series are 
in first differences. The test statistics is the Bekiros and Diks (2006, 2008) nonparametric Granger causality 
test statistics that is based on the correlation integral between the time series. It rests on the Hiemstra and Jones 
(1994) test but it relaxes the assumption that the time series is an iid process. The Panchenko’s C++ code is 
used to get the test statistics and the p-values.  Numbers in brackets are the associated p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
 
 
Table 5: Hatemi-J asymmetric Granger causality test 
 Hypothesis Wald Test Statistic Bootstrap Critical Values 
   1% 5% 10% 
Egypt 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  2.073* 12.743 4.052 2.015 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  6.043** 13.845 2.597 1.154 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  1.276 7.065 2.702 1.698 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  1.034 8.741 3.329 1.942 
Tunisia 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  2.633 7.408 3.937 2.704 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  1.998 5.924 3.599 2.448 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  4.039** 6.502 3.782 2.647 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  7.346*** 7.204 3.654 2.710 
UAE 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  4.376** 6.765 4.041 2.918 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  6.622*** 6.438 3.921 2.655 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  1.067 6.912 4.069 2.569 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  1.887 7.321 4.451 3.097 
Saudi Arabia 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  6.507*** 6.425 3.947 2.658 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  8.669*** 7.534 4.053 2.839 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  3.591** 6.234 3.476 2.541 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  1.608 6.935 3.622 2.672 
Kuwait 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  9.531*** 7.377 3.887 2.612 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  7.089*** 6.913 3.091 2.213 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  0.166 7.118 3.807 2.867 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  3.860* 7.191 4.111 2.998 
Qatar 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  7.330*** 6.765 3.562 2.661 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  8.098*** 7.536 4.365 2.975 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  1.330 6.765 3.562 2.661 
 𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃  0.470 8.503 4.178 2.702 
Note: The vectors (𝐼𝑃  , 𝑂𝑃  ) and  (𝐼𝑃  , 𝑂𝑃 ) are the cumulative positive and negative shocks respectively. 
𝑂𝑃 ≠> 𝐼𝑃 indicates that real oil prices does not cause real industrial production. The max lag length set at 4 
and the optimal one is selected based on by minimizing an information criterion in eq. ( ). We estimate the table 
using Hatemi-J’s (2012) GAUSS code for asymmetric causality.  
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 












Table 6: Static Estimation of the pass-through of oil prices (OP) to industrial production (IP) 
Panel A: Static Linear Regression 
 Egypt Tunisia UAE  Saudi Arabia Kuwait  Qatar 
𝑂𝑃  0.099** (0.011) -0.101*** (0.000) 0.104*** (0.000) 0.099** (0.011) 0.059** (0.044) 0.100*** (0.000) 
𝐼𝑁𝐹  3.324*** (0.000) 2.976*** (0.001) 2.080*** (0.006) 3.324** (0.000) 2.136** (0.039) -0.211 (0.700) 
𝑅  -2.368*** (0.000) -0.563 (0.198) -1.630** (0.017) -2.368*** (0.000) -1.351** (0.015) -0.381 (0.332) 
Trend 0.000 (0.324) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.324) 0.002*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) 
Constant 10.438*** (0.000) 9.493*** (0.000) 10.561*** (0.000) 10.438*** (0.000) 8.936*** (0.000) 9.827*** (0.000) 
𝑅  0.817  0.551  0.662  0.817  0.762  0.839  
𝑅  0.808  0.536  0.648  0.808  0.746  0.832  
𝜒  25.97*** (0.000) 42.46*** (0.000) 17.800*** (0.000) 25.97*** (0.000) 26.91*** (0.000) 2.596 (0.107) 
𝜒  5.31** (0.021) 1.89 (0.169) 2.91* (0.088) 5.31** (0.021) 1.69 (0.193) 1.17 (0.278) 
𝜒  19.83*** (0.000) 0.48 (0.698) 2.08 (0.107) 19.83*** (0.000) 16.19*** (0.000) 1.85 (0.143) 
Panel B: Static Asymmetric Regression    
𝑂𝑃  0.237** (0.019) -0.069*** (0.002) 0.119*** (0.000) 0.137** (0.019) 0.132** (0.012) 0.128*** (0.000) 
𝑂𝑃  -0.131*** (0.000) 0.108*** (0.000) -0.068** (0.001) -0.081*** (0.000) -0.006* (0.064) 0.043* (0.082) 
𝐼𝑁𝐹  2.975*** (0.000) 3.161*** (0.000) 1.994** (0.015) 2.975*** (0.000) 2.302** (0.037) -0.198 (0.866) 
𝑅  -2.128*** (0.000) -0.826* (0.056) -2.742*** (0.000) -2.128*** (0.000) -0.611* (0.066) -0.168 (0.469) 
Constant 10.741 (0.000) 9.257*** (0.000) 10.905*** (0.000) 11.147*** (0.000) 9.308*** (0.000) 9.992*** (0.000) 
𝑅  0.815  0.567  0.604  0.815  0.745  0.814  
𝑅  0.806  0.553  0.588  0.806  0.728  0.805  
𝜒  27.42*** (0.000) 40.65*** (0.000) 23.123*** (0.000) 27.42*** (0.000) 30.28*** (0.000) 0.09 (0.762) 
𝜒  4.66 (0.030) 2.48 (0.115) 2.06 (0.150) 4.66** (0.030) 2.51* (0.113) 0.93 (0.335) 
𝜒  21.62*** (0.000) 0.48 (0.698) 2.27 (0.085) 21.62*** (0.000) 14.02*** (0.000) 4.66*** (0.004) 
𝑊  50.49*** (0.008) 59.35*** (0.000) 60.59*** (0.000) 85.22*** (0.000) 60.62*** (0.000) 26.48*** (0.000) 
Notes: 𝑂𝑃 denotes the natural logarithm of oil price.  The superscripts “+” and “−” denote positive and negative partial sums, respectively. In order to accommodate the strong trending behavior 
of 𝑂𝑃 , we include a deterministic time trend in the symmetric regressions. 𝜒 , 𝜒 , and 𝜒  are the Breusch Godfrey test for higher-order serial correlation. Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
Heteroskedasticity, and Ramsey RESET test for functional form, respectively. 𝑊  is the Wald test of the equality of the coefficients associated with 𝑂𝑃  and  𝑂𝑃 . Numbers in brackets 
are the associated p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table 7: NARDL estimation results for pass-through of oil prices (OP) to industrial production (IP) 
 Egypt Tunisia UAE Saudi Arabia Kuwait  Qatar 
𝐼𝑃  -0.684*** (0.000) -0.311** (0.042) -0.311*** (0.008) -0.264*** (0.003) -0.173** (0.034) -0.708*** (0.000) 
𝑂𝑃  0.273** (0.022) -0.015* (0.081) 0.132*** (0.003) 0.121*** (0.002) 0.056*** (0.008) 0.0619 (0.432) 
𝑂𝑃  -0.100* (0.066) 0.035 (0.312) -0.076*** (0.009) -0.064** (0.033) -0.075** (0.030) -0.010*** (0.002) 
𝐼𝑁𝐹  1.288** (0.025) 1.089** (0.040) -2.412* (0.061) 1.288** (0.025) 1.468* (0.072) 0.009 (0.991) 
𝑅  -0.781*** (0.004) -0.172* (0.071) -2.384*** (0.009) -0.781*** (0.004) -0.317* (0.061) -0.584* (0.068) 
∆𝐼𝑃  -0.055 (0.665) -0.1422 (0.373) -0.487 *** (0.001) -0.152*** (0.000) -0.173** (0.034) -0.228** (0.027) 
∆𝐼𝑃          -0.330*** (0.008)   
∆𝐼𝑃    -0.313*** (0.010) -0.298*** (0.000)       
∆𝐼𝑃        0.199** (0.050)     
∆𝐼𝑃            -0.364*** (0.000) 
∆𝐼𝑃  0.071** (0.047)   -0.384*** (0.000)   -0.411*** (0.001)   
∆𝑂𝑃  0.341** (0.048) -0.079** (0.049) 0.391*** (0.004) 0.803*** (0.001) 0.187** (0.011) 0.075* (0.054) 
∆𝑂𝑃  0.309* (0.054)     0.132** (0.030) 0.111** (0.033) 0.135** (0.018) 
∆𝑂𝑃    -0.094** (0.041)   0.299* (0.069)     
∆𝑂𝑃  -0.135** (0.043) 0.003* (0.096) -0.093** (0.040) -0.0623** (0.023) -0.133*** (0.005) -0.088** (0.032) 
∆𝑂𝑃            -0.078** (0.040) 
∆𝑂𝑃  -0.044* (0.067) 0.177* (0.097) -0.0232 (0.082) -0.130*** (0.001) -0.083*** (0.002)   
∆𝐼𝑁𝐹  2.627*** (0.000) 4.258** (0.015) 1.369* (0.054) 2.627*** (0.000) 1.130* (0.072) -0.212 (0.790) 
∆𝑅  -1.526*** (0.001) 2.548 (0.115) -3.189*** (0.004) -2.526*** (0.001) -1.496*** (0.009)   
Constant 7.677*** (0.000) 2.890** (0.043) 2.894*** (0.011) 4.067*** (0.000) 1.611** (0.034) 3.329*** (0.007) 
𝐿  0.399** (0.024) -0.383** (0.017) 0.425*** (0.000) 0.398*** (0.002) 0.323*** (0.007) 0.008 (0.810) 
𝐿  -0.147** (0.013) 0.089 (0.385) -0.245*** (0.000) -0.213** (0.040) -0.147** (0.046) -0.102*** (0.000) 
𝑅  0.84  0.61  0.637  0.739  0.876  0.808  
𝑅  0.69  0.43  0.511  0.562  0.658  0.647  
𝜒  29.89 (0.790) 37.05 (0.603) 38.43 (0.541) 21.42 (0.980) 41.80 (0.233) 51.33* (0.089) 
𝜒  0.21 (0.642) 0.23 (0.627) 0.521 (0.470) 2.714 (0.299) 1.269 (0.252) 0.549 (0.599) 
𝜒  2.27 (0.103) 1.12 (0.347) 0.653 (0.583) 1.17 (0.509) 1.231 (0.308) 1.735 (0.180) 
𝑡  -4.209  -3.787  -4.783  -5. 784  -2.159  -4.840  
𝐹  4.074  3.632  11.260  8.587  2.164  7.944  
Note: This table reports the estimation results of the best-suited NARDL specifications for the pairs comprised of oil prices and industrial production. 𝐿  and 𝐿  are long-run coefficients associated with positive 
and negative changes of oil prices, respectively. 𝑡  is the Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre (1998) t-statistic while 𝐹  denotes the Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001)  F-statistic for bounds test respectively. Following 
Shin et al. (2014), the preferred specication is chosen by starting with max p = max q = 12 and dropping all insignificant stationary regressors. The 5% critical values of 𝑡 t are -3.53 and -3.22 for k = 2 and k = 1, 
respectively, while the equivalent values for 𝐹  are 4.85 and 5.73. Numbers in brackets are the associated p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 








Table 8: Results of short- and long-run symmetry tests in multivariate setting 
Country  𝑊  𝑊  
Egypt 11.59*** (0.001) 6.83** (0.012) 
Tunisia 11.65*** (0.001) 0.044 (0.835) 
UAE 75.67*** (0.000) 11.98*** (0.001) 
Saudi Arabia 32.33*** (0.000) 16.92*** (0.000) 
Kuwait 8.695** (0.005) 3.913* (0.074) 
Qatar 57.24*** (0.000) 2.0435 (0.102) 
Notes: The table reports the results of the short- and long-run symmetry tests for the effect of oil prices on the 
industrial production. 𝑊  denotes the Wald test for the short-run symmetry, while 𝑊  corresponds to the 
Wald test for long-run symmetry. Numbers in brackets are the associated p-values. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
 
 
Table 9: Wald Test for asymmetries  
Country  𝜒  p-values 
Egypt 217.579*** (0.000) 
Tunisia 157.662*** (0.000) 
UAE 626.820*** (0.000) 
Saudi Arabia 1455.985*** (0.000) 
Kuwait 224.238*** (0.000) 
Qatar 928.574*** (0.000) 
Notes: this table report the Wald test and its p-values with the null hypothesis of joint significant, that is 𝛾 , = 𝛾 , =
0 for all 𝑖.  
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
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Table 10: Testing the symmetry of the response, 𝑯𝟎 ∶ 𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑰𝑷(𝒉, 𝜹) = −𝑰𝑹𝑭𝑰𝑷(𝒉, −𝜹) for 𝒉 =, 𝟎, 𝟏, … , 𝑯 
 Egypt Tunisia UAE Saudi Arabia Kuwait Qatar 
ℎ 𝜎 2𝜎 𝜎 2𝜎 𝜎 2𝜎 𝜎 2𝜎 𝜎 2𝜎 𝜎 2𝜎 
0 0.004*** 0.001*** 0.946 0.935 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.016** 0.008*** 0.381 0.502 0.399 0.497 
2 0.009*** 0.000*** 0.091* 0.033** 0.027** 0.001*** 0.062* 0.034** 0.018** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 
4 0.030** 0.001*** 0.281 0.066* 0.082* 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.027** 0.061* 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.000*** 
8 0.079* 0.001*** 0.582 0.020** 0.148 0.000*** 0.030** 0.095* 0.085* 0.000*** 0.033** 0.001*** 
10 0.145 0.003*** 0.740 0.023** 0.288 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.018** 0.278 0.001*** 0.052* 0.000*** 
12 0.178 0.004*** 0.788 0.027** 0.532 0.003*** 0.100* 0.023** 0.339 0.001*** 0.074* 0.000*** 
Notes: The table shows the p-vales of testing the symmetric impulse responses of industrial production to positive and negative shocks in real oil price of one standard deviation shocks, δ=σ  ̂ 
and two standard deviation shocks, δ=2σ )̂. p−values are based on the 𝜒 . The estimated impulse response functions computed using 10,000 bootstrap simulations. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 






Table A1: Unit root tests for asymmetric components 
  ADF with constant and linear trend Lee-Strazicich two-break unit-root test 
  Level First Difference Level First Difference 
Real industrial production (IP) 
Egypt 𝐼𝑃  -1.866 (0.663) -10.447*** (0.000) -7.011*** -17.167*** 
 𝐼𝑃  -4.031** (0.010) -10.995*** (0.000) -5.059 -9.203*** 
Tunisia 𝐼𝑃  -1.057 (0.931) -14.083*** (0.000) -6.062** -14.020*** 
 𝐼𝑃  -1.310 (0.880) -12.542*** (0.000) -5.633** -9.616*** 
UAE 𝐼𝑃  0.526 (0.999) -14.687*** (0.000) -6.722*** -9.310*** 
 𝐼𝑃  0.200 (0.997) -14.310*** (0.000) -4.789 -11.067*** 
Saudi Arabia 𝐼𝑃  -1.724 (0.734) -9.594*** (0.000) -6.028*** -10.040*** 
 𝐼𝑃  -1.606 (0.785) -10.698*** (0.000) -3.844 -8.375*** 
Kuwait 𝐼𝑃  -1.447 (0.840) -9.656*** (0.000) -6.220** -7.954*** 
 𝐼𝑃  0.458 (0.999) -13.909*** (0.000) -4.753 -7.936*** 
Qatar 𝐼𝑃  -3.019 (0.132) -8.545*** (0.000) -4.028 -8.620*** 
 𝐼𝑃  -1.625 (0.776) -13.316*** (0.000) -4.075 -7.622*** 
Real oil prices (OP) 
Egypt 𝑂𝑃  -1.259 (0.891) -7.890*** (0.000) -5.947* -9.012*** 
 𝑂𝑃  -1.889 (0.651) -6.465*** (0.000) -5.543 -7.343*** 
Tunisia 𝑂𝑃  -1.897 (0.649) -10.792*** (0.000) -4.651 -8.184*** 
 𝑂𝑃  -2.448 (0.353) -6.911*** (0.000) -4.665 -8.284*** 
UAE 𝑂𝑃  -2.190 (0.490) -10.189*** (0.000) -4.670 -8.754*** 
 𝑂𝑃  -2.496 (0.329) -6.328*** (0.000) -4.854 -7.625*** 
Saudi Arabia 𝑂𝑃  -2.039 (0.574) -10.705*** (0.000) -4.998 -8.158*** 
 𝑂𝑃  -2.452 (0.351) -6.821*** (0.000) -4.531 -7.859*** 
Kuwait 𝑂𝑃  -1.202 (0.904) -10.107*** (0.000) -5.470 -8.226*** 
 𝑂𝑃  -1.908 (0.643) -6.709*** (0.000) -6.794** -8.508*** 
Qatar 𝑂𝑃  -3.037 (0.126) -10.061*** (0.000) -4.025 -7.626*** 
 𝑂𝑃  -1.992 (0.599) -7.173*** (0.000) -6.416*** -8.855*** 
Notes: The TDICPS software developed by Hatemi-J and Mustafa (2016) was used to transform the data into cumulative partial sums for 
positive and negative components. H0: ln(variable) has a unit root. The optimal lags for ADF test were selected by Schwarz information 
criterion with a max lag length set at 12. Critical values are -4.063, -3.460, and 3.156 for 1%, 5% and 10% level. The values in parentheses 
are p-values. Critical values Lee-Strazicich test are -5.847, -5.332, and -5.064 for 1%, 5% and 10% level. The number of lags was set at 
maximum 12. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 










































































Note: The TDICPS software developed by Hatemi-J and Mustafa (2016) was used to transform the data into cumulative 







Figure 3: The oil-industrial production tradeoff dynamic multipliers  
Egypt Tunisia 
  




Notes: These graphs give cumulative effects of positive and negative oil shocks on industrial production. Shade areas are 
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Figure 4: The response of industrial production to a positive oil price shock by shock size 
Egypt Tunisia 
UAE Saudi Arabia 
Kuwait Qatar 
Notes: Each plot illustrates impulse responses based on the non-linear methodology by Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a,b). 
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